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Abstract
Introduction: Controversy exists about the benefit of screening for prevention of methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) in intensive care units (ICUs) and recent studies have shown conflicting results. The
aim of this observational study was to describe and evaluate the association between MRSA incidence densities
(IDs) and screening and control measures in ICUs participating in the German Nosocomial Infection Surveillance
System.
Methods: The surveillance module for multidrug-resistant bacteria collects data on MRSA cases in ICUs with the
aim to provide a national reference and a tool for evaluation of infection control management. The median IDs of
MRSA cases per 1000 patient-days (pd) with the interquartile range (IQR) were calculated from the pooled data of
186 ICUs and correlated with parameters derived from a detailed questionnaire regarding ICU structure,
microbiological diagnostics and MRSA screening and control measures. The association between questionnaire
results and MRSA cases was evaluated by generalized linear regression models.
Results: One hundred eighty-six ICUs submitted data on MRSA cases for 2007 and 2008 and completed the
questionnaire. During the period of analysis, 4935 MRSA cases occurred in these ICUs; of these, 3928 (79.6%) were
imported and 1007 MRSA cases (20.4%) were ICU-acquired. Median MRSA IDs were 3.23 (IQR 1.24-5.73), 2.24 (IQR
0.63-4.30) and 0.64 (IQR 0.17-1.39) per 1000 pd for all cases, imported and ICU-acquired MRSA cases, respectively.
MRSA IDs as well as implemented MRSA screening and control measures varied widely between ICUs. ICUs
performing universal admission screening had significantly higher MRSA IDs than ICUs performing targeted or no
screening. Separate regression models for ICUs with different screening strategies included the incidence of
imported MRSA cases, the type of ICU, and the length of stay in independent association with the number of ICU-
acquired MRSA cases.
Conclusions: The analysis shows that MRSA IDs and structural parameters differ considerably between ICUs. In
response, ICUs have combined screening and control measures in many ways to achieve various individual
solutions. The incidence of imported MRSA cases might be helpful for consideration in the planning of MRSA
control programmes.
Introduction
Infections with methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aur-
eus (MRSA) are associated with increased mortality and
excess costs [1,2]. Intensive care units (ICUs) are high-
risk areas for the selection and transmission of multi-
drug-resistant bacteria [3,4], and surveillance data show
that MRSA is endemic in ICUs in all German regions
[5]. Measures to reduce MRSA transmission in ICUs
include hand and environmental hygiene, contact isola-
tion, and patient decolonization; however, the imple-
mentation of these control measures depends on the
fast and reliable identification of MRSA carriers. The
most effective strategies for MRSA screening are the
subject of current research and discussion [6-10]. Active
MRSA surveillance cultures have been shown to reduce
MRSA infections not only in ICUs performing screening
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evaluating the effectiveness of active MRSA surveillance
cultures in ICUs concluded that the amount and quality
of existing evidence are not sufficient for definitive
recommendations [12]. In addition, new laboratory tools
that are improving and speeding up diagnostics continue
to be developed [13], but their usefulness and cost-effec-
tiveness have yet to be demonstrated [14].
Analysis of the influence of individual as well as struc-
tural risk factors and the impact of control efforts such
as screening on MRSA transmission in hospitals is
important for planning and evaluation of control pro-
grams. The aim of this observational study was to
describe and evaluate the association of MRSA inci-
dence densities (IDs) and screening and control mea-
sures in 186 ICUs participating in the German
Nosocomial Infection Surveillance System. To achieve
this aim, data on ICU structure and process parameters
derived from a detailed quest i o n n a i r ew e r ec o r r e l a t e d
with the MRSA IDs of these ICUs from the years 2007
and 2008.
Materials and methods
Surveillance of MRSA cases
Detailed methods of the modules of the German Noso-
comial Infection Surveillance System for surveillance of
nosocomial infections and multidrug-resistant bacteria
in ICUs have been described previously [5,15]. In short,
the surveillance module for multidrug-resistant bacteria
(MDR-KISS) collects, among other multidrug-resistant
bacteria data, data on all admitted patients with MRSA,
including colonized patients and patients with infections
not fulfilling the definitions of nosocomial infections of
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Surveil-
lance of MRSA started in 2003, and 240 ICUs regularly
submitted data on MRSA cases at the beginning of this
study in 2007. Surveillance is performed for all patients
admitted to these ICUs; however, patient-based data are
collected only for patients with a culture that was posi-
tive for MRSA and that was recovered during the ICU
stay or for patients known to be carriers on admission.
Cases are differentiated between imported and ICU-
acquired on the basis of a temporal definition with a 48-
hour interval between admission and detection of MRSA
a sac u t o f f .T h ef o l l o w i n gd a t aa r ec o l l e c t e df o re v e r y
patient carrying MRSA in participating ICUs: dates of
admission, discharge, and first isolation of MRSA;
import of MRSA (defined as known carriage or detec-
tion of MRSA in any clinical or surveillance culture
within 48 hours of ICU admission) or acquisition during
the ICU stay (defined as detection within more than 48
hours of ICU admission); presence of colonization or
presence of an infection that requires treatment during
the ICU stay; and, in case of infection, the site of
infection. For the denominator, the total number of
patient-days (pd) is determined without excluding the
patient-days of MRSA-positive patients.
The data are collected and stored anonymously and
according to national guidelines for data protection. All
data collected by MDR-KISS and included in this study
are obtained during routine surveillance required by the
German Protection against Infection Act (Infek-
tionsschutzgesetz) [16]. In paragraph 23 of this law, hos-
pitals are obliged to continuously collect and analyze
data on nosocomial infections and resistant pathogens.
No additional data not covered by this law are used for
this study. Ethical approval and informed consent are,
thus, not required. Data are collected by trained medical
or infection control personnel in individual ICUs and
are submitted via a web-based surveillance portal to the
central database of the national reference center. MRSA
isolates of submitted cases are not collected for further
analysis such as molecular typing. Mean and median
IDs of MRSA cases per 1,000 pd with the interquartile
ranges are calculated for all MRSA cases and the subca-
tegories of imported and ICU-acquired cases from the
pooled data of all ICUs as a reference for comparison
with local MRSA IDs.
Definitions of MRSA cases
1. MRSA case: any patient who is carrying MRSA and
who is admitted to participating ICUs, including patients
with infection and colonization as well as imported and
ICU-acquired cases.
2. Imported MRSA case: a patient with known car-
riage of MRSA on admission or detection of MRSA in
any clinical or surveillance culture within 48 hours of
admission.
3. ICU-acquired MRSA case: a patient with detection
of MRSA in any clinical or surveillance culture within
more than 48 hours of admission.
Survey of MRSA control measures
In 2008, a detailed questionnaire with 75 questions
regarding ICU structure (for example, number of beds,
single rooms, and health-care staff), microbiological
diagnostics (for example, routine urine and respiratory
surveillance cultures), MRSA screening procedures (for
example, polymerase chain reaction-based or culture-
based screening and patient population screened),
MRSA control measures (for example, single-room iso-
lation, pre-emptive isolation, and decolonization proto-
cols), infection control education, and implementation
of surveillance was sent to participating ICUs. Questions
were directed at control practices performed in 2007.
All ICUs participating in the MDR-KISS surveillance
network were asked to complete the questionnaire;
ICUs were not chosen prospectively for performing or
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questionnaire were submitted online to the national
reference center.
To describe the use of combinations or bundles of
control measures, a tree diagram, including the three
key control parameters of screening policy, isolation of
MRSA carriers, and decolonization, was constructed.
For this diagram, three categories of screening (universal
admission screening, targeted screening, and no screen-
ing) and three categories of isolation practices were dis-
tinguished. The categories for isolation practices were
strict single-room isolation defined as isolation of all
MRSA carriers in single rooms; single-room isolation or
contact precautions defined as isolation of MRSA car-
riers in single rooms if possible (but if no single room
was available, contact precautions in larger rooms were
performed); contact precautions defined as performance
of contact precautions for MRSA carriers in larger
rooms and no attempt of single-room isolation. Median
IDs of MRSA cases per 1,000 pd with interquartile
ranges were calculated for nine subgroups of ICUs
implementing different screening and isolation
strategies.
Generalized linear models
Generalized linear models (GLMs) were used to esti-
mate the association between parameters derived from
the questionnaire and the number of all MRSA cases
and the number of ICU-acquired MRSA cases, respec-
tively. In the analysis, we considered the three key con-
trol parameters described above and their interactions,
pre-emptive isolation, and the structural parameters of
hospital type and size and ICU type and size, short
admissions of less than 48 hours of less than one third
of admitted patients, the percentage of ventilator beds,
the number or percentage of single rooms, and the
nurse-to-patient ratio. The nurse-to-patient ratio was
calculated as the number of nurses per shift per patient.
For employed nurses in 2007, a 40-hour week, not
including sick or vacation days, was considered.
Additionally, to adjust better for the severity of dis-
ease, the length of stay and device use (use of central
venous catheters and ventilation per 100 pd) were con-
sidered as potential confounding parameters in the
model. We used negative binomial distribution in the
model instead of Poisson distribution because the var-
iance exceeds the mean and we observed overdispersion
for the number of MRSA cases. The log number of
patient-days was treated as an offset in the model. A
stepwise forward approach was applied for the multi-
variate analysis. Selection criteria were the highest chi-
square value and a P value of less than 0.05 in the type
III score statistic. The Akaike information criterion was
used as goodness-of-fit measure in the GLM. P values of
less than 0.05 were considered significant. All analyses
were performed with SPSS (IBM SPSS Statistics; IBM
Corporation, Armonk, NY, USA) and SAS (SAS Insti-
tute Inc., Cary, NC, USA).
Results
Surveillance of MRSA cases
Two hundred forty ICU-KISS ICUs with at least 1
month of MDR-KISS data in the period from 2003 to
2007 were asked to complete the questionnaire, and 186
ICUs responded (response rate of 77.5%). There was no
significant difference by hospital type and size or ICU
type and size between responding and non-responding
ICUs. The 186 responding ICUs admitted 302,524
patients with 1,075,364 pd and 430,685 ventilator-days
from 2007 to 2008. Four thousand nine hundred thirty-
five MRSA cases occurred in these ICUs during the per-
iod of analysis; of these, 3,928 (79.6%) were imported
and 1,007 MRSA cases (20.4%) were ICU-acquired
according to the definitions. Calculated per ICU, this
translates to a median of 9 MRSA cases (7 imported
and 2 acquired) per year with a range from 0 to 163
yearly MRSA cases. Structural characteristics as well as
device use and the IDs of MRSA cases in the 186 study
ICUs are shown in Table 1.
Survey of MRSA control measures
T h er e s u l t so ft h eq u e s t i o n n a i r ef o rt h em o s tr e l e v a n t
MRSA screening and control measures are shown in
Table 2. Individual MRSA control measures were imple-
mented in several different combinations. Taking into
account the three key control parameters of screening
policy, isolation of identified carriers, and decolonization
resulted in 17 different combinations (Figure 1). The
most common combination of control measures used by
ICUs was targeted screening, strict single-room isola-
tion, and decolonization with mupirocin (Figure 1). The
MRSA IDs of the 186 ICUs stratified by the implemen-
ted screening and isolation measures are shown in
Table 3. The MRSA IDs of the different groups of ICUs
varied significantly for all MRSA cases and imported
MRSA cases but not for ICU-acquired MRSA cases
(Table 3). A comparison of ICUs performing universal
admission screening with ICUs performing targeted or
no screening revealed that ICUs with universal admis-
sion screening had a significantly higher number of ICU
and hospital beds, longer length of stay, and higher
device use than ICUs with other screening policies (data
not shown).
Generalized linear models
The total number of MRSA cases per ICU was indepen-
dently associated with the MRSA screening policy and
the size of the hospital in the GLM (Table 4). Analyses
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ICU subgroups stratified according to screening strate-
gies show an independent association of the type of ICU
and the incidence of imported MRSA cases in the
model with 51 ICUs with universal admission screening
(Table 5); an independent association of the type of
ICU, the incidence of imported MRSA cases, and the
length of stay in the model with 91 ICUs with targeted
screening (Table 6); and an independent association of
the incidence of imported MRSA cases in the model
with 44 ICUs without screening (Table 7) with ICU-
acquired MRSA cases, respectively.
Discussion
Controversy exists about the benefit of screening for pre-
venting MRSA transmission in hospitals and the most
effective methods and strategies for MRSA screening
programs, and recent studies have shown conflicting
results regarding the effect of MRSA screening and
control interventions [6-10,17-20]. In the present study,
we evaluated the MRSA IDs and influencing factors in
186 German ICUs with a focus on MRSA screening pro-
cedures. The descriptive analysis shows large variation
between ICUs in MRSA IDs as well as in MRSA screen-
ing and control measures implemented in daily practice.
Table 1 Structural characteristics, use of invasive devices,
and incidence densities of methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus in 186 intensive care units
Characteristics of ICUs Responding ICUs
Type of ICU, number (percentage)
Medical-surgical ICUs 88 (47.3)
Surgical ICUs 44 (23.7)
Medical ICUs 42 (22.6)
Other ICUs 12 (6.4)
Hospital type, number (percentage)
University hospital ICUs 36 (19.4)
Teaching hospital ICUs 89 (47.8)
Non-academic hospital ICUs 61 (32.8)
ICU structure
Number of beds, median (IQR) 11 (8-14)
Number of single rooms, median (IQR) 2 (1-4)
Percentage of ventilator beds, median (IQR) 76 (50-100)
Length of stay in days, median (IQR) 3.7 (2.8-4.8)
Nurse-to-patient ratio
a (IQR) 0.66 (0.56-0.76)
ICUs with less than 1/3 of short admissions of
less than 48 hours, number (percentage)
59 (31.7)
Use of invasive devices, median (IQR)
Ventilation use
b 35.7 (23.5-49.5)
Central venous catheter use
b 66.6 (52.6-80.0)
Urinary tract catheter use
b 82.0 (72.8-90.1)
MRSA IDs, median (IQR)
ID of all MRSA cases 3.23 (1.24-5.73)
ID of imported MRSA cases 2.24 (0.63-4.30)
Incidence of imported MRSA cases 0.79 (0.23-1.88)
ID of ICU-acquired MRSA cases 0.64 (0.17-1.39)
aCalculated by nurses per shift per patient; for employed nurses in 2007, a 40-
hour week, not including sick and vacation days, was considered.
bPer 100
patient-days. ICU, intensive care unit; ID, incidence density per 1,000 patient-
days; IQR, interquartile range; MRSA, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus.
Table 2 Screening and control measures for methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus in 186 intensive care
units
MRSA screening and control measures Responding
ICUs,
number
(percentage)
ICUs with MRSA data and questionnaire results 186 (100.0)
Screening policy (n = 186)
No MRSA screening 44 (23.7)
Any type of MRSA screening 142 (76.3)
Universal admission screening of all patients 51 (27.4)
Targeted screening of risk populations 91 (48.9)
Screening of known carriers on readmission 67 (36.0)
Screening of contact patients 62 (33.3)
Screening of defined high-risk patients 53 (28.5)
Screening method (n = 142)
Culture-based MRSA screening 74 (52.1)
PCR-based screening 11 (7.8)
Culture- and PCR-based screening 57 (40.1)
Microbiologic diagnostics (n = 186)
External microbiology laboratory 99 (53.2)
In-house microbiology laboratory 77 (41.4)
Performance of respiratory surveillance cultures 68 (36.6)
Performance of urine surveillance cultures 49 (26.3)
MRSA alert system (n = 186)
Computer-based MRSA alert system 134 (72.0)
Paper-based MRSA alert system 19 (10.2)
Isolation of known MRSA carriers (n = 186)
Isolation of MRSA carriers in SRs 174 (93.5)
Strict SR isolation 102 (54.8)
SR isolation if available or contact
precautions in larger rooms
72 (38.7)
Contact precautions (and no SR isolation) 12 (6.5)
Pre-emptive isolation (n = 186)
Carriers on readmission 111 (59.7)
Contact patients 76 (40.9)
Defined high-risk patients 67 (36.0)
All admissions 13 (7.0)
Topical decolonization (n = 186)
Decolonization of all MRSA carriers with
mupirocin
113 (60.8)
Decolonization of selected MRSA carriers with
mupirocin
60 (32.3)
Mupirocin in combination with antiseptic
washing
165 (88.7)
ICU, intensive care unit; MRSA, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus;P C R ,
polymerase chain reaction; SR, single room.
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Although MRSA was shown to be endemic in ICUs of
all German regions [5], the MRSA IDs in the analyzed
ICUs are not uniform. The MRSA burden in ICUs
ranges from ICUs with no cases within the two-year
period of analysis to 30.1 MRSA cases per 1,000 pd. Pre-
vious studies have shown that the benefit to be expected
from active surveillance cultures is dependent on the
local reservoir of MRSA carriers [21]. The variation
between the MRSA IDs of ICUs in this study suggests
that the extent of control efforts needed and their
potential benefit for patients will differ considerably
between ICUs.
Impact of MRSA screening strategies
A comparison of the MRSA IDs of the ICUs in our
sample stratified according to screening strategies shows
that ICUs performing universal admission screening
have significantly higher MRSA IDs than ICUs with tar-
geted or no MRSA screening. However, it remains
unclear to which extent the high MRSA IDs in ICUs
with universal screening programs are the cause (imple-
mentation of screening because of a perceived MRSA
problem) or the effect (better detection of MRSA car-
riers) of MRSA screening. A comparison of structure
and process parameters shows that ICUs performing
universal screening are high-risk units for MRSA with
higher use of invasive devices, longer length of stay, and
a higher number of ICU and hospital beds than ICUs
without universal screening programs. In addition, the
regression analysis shows an independent association of
the size of the hospital and screening policies with
MRSA cases. The influence of the structural parameter
and the distortion caused by screening suggests that the
total number of MRSA cases is not a suitable parameter
for benchmarking of ICUs.
Variation of MRSA control measures
Substantial variation in MRSA control measures
between European countries has been described [22].
Our study shows that the implemented control mea-
sures also differ considerably between ICUs within one
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Figure 1 Tree diagram of combinations of the three key control measures implemented in 186 intensive care units in this study. The
control measures are screening for methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), isolation of identified MRSA carriers, and decolonization.
DC, decolonization of all MRSA carriers; ICU, intensive care unit; SR, single room.
Kohlenberg et al. Critical Care 2011, 15:R285
http://ccforum.com/content/15/6/R285
Page 5 of 10Table 3 Numbers and incidence densities of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus in 186 intensive care units
stratified according to screening and isolation measures
Control measures ICUs MRSA
cases
ICU-
acquired
MRSA
cases
Patients Patient-
days
ID of all
MRSA
cases
a
ID of
imported
MRSA cases
a
Incidence of
imported MRSA
cases
a
ID of ICU-
acquired
MRSA cases
Number Number Number Number Number Median
(IQR)
Median (IQR) Median (IQR) Median (IQR)
Universal admission
screening and strict SR
isolation
17 676 102 24,887 112,122 5.69 (3.04-
6.83)
3.74 (1.39-
6.07)
1.98 (0.73-2.65) 0.71 (0.28-1.28)
Universal admission
screening and SR or
contact precautions
28 1,230 191 43,419 182,859 5.91 (3.02-
9.88)
4.2 (2.39-9.45) 2.8 (1.31-3.37) 0.84 (0.37-1.62)
Universal admission
screening and contact
precautions
6 472 68 7,916 37,097 8.81 6.72 4.93 1.67
Targeted screening and
strict SR isolation
57 1,298 287 98,396 341,332 2.55 (1.05-
5.6)
1.87 (0.56-
4.18)
0.6 (0.22-1.21) 0.42 (0.14-1.12)
Targeted screening and SR
or contact precautions
30 696 169 51,054 162,083 2.91 (1.01-
5.68)
1.47 (0.22-
3.88)
0.62 (0.09-1.33) 0.67 (0-1.34)
Targeted screening and
contact precautions
4 102 29 8,221 33,850 3.69 2.4 0.98 0.61
No screening and strict SR
isolation
28 260 91 46,999 128,413 1.44 (0.05-
3.34)
0.68 (0-2.19) 0.18 (0-0.91) 0.62 (0-1.03)
No screening and SR or
contact precautions
14 190 68 19,715 69,517 3.31 (1.62-
4.11)
2.05 (0.28-
3.49)
0.73 (0.1-1.09) 1.16 (0.47-1.4)
No screening and contact
precautions
2 11 2 1,917 8,091 1.37 1.12 0.47 0.24
aSignificant difference by Kruskal-Wallis test (P < 0.001). ICU, intensive care unit; ID, incidence density; IQR, interquartile range (shown only if n > 10); MRSA,
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; SR, single room.
Table 4 Results of the multivariable analysis for all cases of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
ICU structure and process parameters IRR (95% CI) P value
a
Type of screening
No screening 1 = reference ≤0.001
Targeted screening of risk patients 1.46 (1.00-2.14)
Universal admission screening 2.73 (1.78-4.18)
Size of the hospital
Hospital size not greater than the median 1 = reference 0.001
Hospital size greater than the median 1.66 (1.22-2.24)
Not significant in the multivariable analysis
Isolation (strict SR isolation/SR or contact precautions/contact precautions)
Decolonization with mupirocin (decolonization of all/not all MRSA patients)
Interactions: screening-isolation, screening-decolonization, isolation-decolonization
Pre-emptive isolation
Short admissions of less than 48 hours of less than 1/3 of admitted patients
Nurse-to-patient ratio (not greater than the median/greater than the median)
Percentage of ventilator beds (not greater than the median/greater than the median)
Number and percentage of SRs (not greater than the median/greater than the median)
Size of ICU (not greater than the median/greater than the median)
Type of hospital (university/academic/other)
Type of ICU (medical-surgical/medical/surgical/other)
Length of stay (not greater than the median/greater than the median)
Device use (CVC, ventilation) (not greater than the median/greater than the median)
In the generalized linear regression model, the negative binomial distribution was used and the log number of patient-days was treated as an offset parameter.
A stepwise forward approach was applied, and the selection criteria were the highest chi-square value and
aP value of less than 0.05 in the type III score chi-
square statistic. CI, confidence interval; CVC, central venous catheter; ICU, intensive care unit; IRR, incidence rate ratio; MRSA, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus; SR, single room.
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components of MRSA control such as screening, isola-
tion, and decolonization has been described as weak
[23]. In addition, the wide range of implemented combi-
nations of control measures in association with differ-
ences in hospital structure, patient population, and
imported MRSA incidence might explain the difficulty
to evaluate the benefit of MRSA screening programs.
The variety of different MRSA situations in the 186
ICUs indicates that studies of specific MRSA control
strategies performed in a single ICU will have very lim-
ited general applicability.
Generalized linear models
Factors associated with ICU-acquired MRSA cases in
the GLMs analyzing three subgroups of ICUs with dif-
ferent screening strategies include the type of ICU, the
imported MRSA incidence, and the length of ICU stay.
The impact of these factors has been shown before
[24,25] and is also further investigated in a separate ana-
lysis of a subgroup of ICUs from our sample [26]. The
models show no association between a single MRSA
screening or control measure and ICU-acquired MRSA
cases; however, screening and other control measures
are unlikely to be successful as isolated measures. A
decision-analytical model has shown that the combina-
tion of active surveillance and decolonization was more
effective than active surveillance alone [27], but the
importance of individual components of MRSA control
programs and the minimum effective measures needed
for MRSA control are not known [28]. We therefore
aimed to assess the interactions of control measures;
however, after stratification of ICUs into subgroups
according to implemented screening strategies to mini-
mize MRSA ID distortion due to screening, no combi-
nation of isolation and decolonization measures was
found to be associated with ICU-acquired MRSA cases.
The incidence of imported MRSA cases was associated
with ICU-acquired cases independently of the imple-
mented screening strategy and the effort made to iden-
tify MRSA carriers. This result indicates that the
incidence of imported MRSA cases could provide a hint
for the extent of control measures needed in ICUs.
Limitations
In spite of including combinations of relevant control
strategies and adjusting for the imported incidence of
MRSA and proxy measures for the admitted patient
population and disease severity, our model will fall short
of capturing the complexity of MRSA control in ICUs.
Table 5 Results of the multivariable analysis for ICU-acquired MRSA-cases of 51 ICUs performing universal admission
screening
ICU structure and process parameters IRR (95% CI) P value
a
Type of ICU
Medical-surgical ICU 1 = reference 0.004
Medical ICU 0.41 (0.23-0.73)
Surgical ICU 0.47 (0.28-0.80)
Other ICU 0.46 (0.16-1.34)
Incidence of imported MRSA cases
Incidence of imported cases not greater than the median 1 = reference 0.026
Incidence of imported cases greater than the median 2.08 (1.09-4.00)
Not significant in the multivariable analysis
Isolation (strict SR isolation/SR or contact precautions/contact precautions)
Decolonization with mupirocin (decolonization of all/not all MRSA patients)
Interaction: isolation-decolonization
Pre-emptive isolation
Short admissions of less than 48 hours of less than 1/3 of admitted patients
Nurse-to-patient ratio (not greater than the median/greater than the median)
Percentage of ventilator beds (not greater than the median/greater than the median)
Number and percentage of SRs (not greater than the median/greater than the median)
Size of hospital and ICU (not greater than the median/greater than the median)
Type of hospital (university/academic/other)
Length of stay (not greater than the median/greater than the median)
Device use (CVC, ventilation) (not greater than the median/greater than the median)
In the generalized linear regression model, the negative binomial distribution was used and the log number of patient-days was treated as an offset parameter.
A stepwise forward approach was applied, and the selection criteria were the highest chi-square value and
aP value of less than 0.05 in the type III score chi-
square statistic. CI, confidence interval; CVC, central venous catheter; ICU, intensive care unit; IRR, incidence rate ratio; MRSA, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus; SR, single room.
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Page 7 of 10Table 6 Results of the multivariable analysis for ICU-acquired MRSA cases of 91 ICUs performing targeted screening
ICU structure and process parameters IRR (95% CI) P value
a
Type of ICU
Medical-surgical ICU 1 = reference < 0.001
Medical ICU 0.32 (0.17-0.59)
Surgical ICU 1.31 (0.80-2.16)
Other ICU 0.45 (0.11-1.79)
Incidence of imported MRSA cases
Incidence of imported cases not greater than the median 1 = reference < 0.001
Incidence of imported cases greater than the median 2.63 (1.69-4.00)
Length of stay
Length of stay not greater than the median 1 = reference 0.041
Length of stay greater than the median 1.58 (1.02-2.47)
Not significant in the multivariable analysis
Isolation (strict SR isolation/SR or contact precautions/contact precautions)
Decolonization with mupirocin (decolonization of all/not all MRSA patients)
Interaction: isolation-decolonization
Pre-emptive isolation
Short admissions of less than 48 hours of less than 1/3 of admitted patients
Nurse-to-patient ratio (not greater than the median/greater than the median)
Percentage of ventilator beds (not greater than the median/greater than the median)
Number and percentage of SRs (not greater than the median/greater than the median)
Size of hospital and ICU (not greater than the median/greater than the median)
Type of hospital (university/academic/other)
Device use (CVC, ventilation) (not greater than the median/greater than the median)
In the generalized linear regression model, the negative binomial distribution was used and the log number of patient-days was treated as an offset parameter.
A stepwise forward approach was applied, and the selection criteria were the highest chi-square value and
aP value of less than 0.05 in the type III score chi-
square statistic. CI, confidence interval; CVC, central venous catheter; ICU, intensive care unit; IRR, incidence rate ratio; MRSA, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus; SR, single room.
Table 7 Results of the multivariable analysis for ICU-acquired MRSA cases of 44 ICUs performing no MRSA screening
ICU structure and process parameters IRR (95% CI) P value
a
Incidence of imported MRSA cases
Incidence of imported cases not greater than the median 1 = reference 0.003
Incidence of imported cases greater than the median 1.94 (1.25-3.02)
Not significant in the multivariable analysis
Isolation (strict SR isolation/SR or contact precautions/contact precautions)
Decolonization with mupirocin (decolonization of all/not all MRSA patients)
Pre-emptive isolation
Short admissions of less than 48 hours of less than 1/3 of admitted patients
Nurse-to-patient ratio (not greater than the median/greater than the median)
Percentage of ventilator beds (not greater than the median/greater than the median)
Number and percentage of SRs (not greater than the median/greater than the median)
Size of hospital and ICU (not greater than the median/greater than the median)
Type of hospital (university/academic/other)
Type of ICU (medical-surgical, medical, surgical, other)
Device use (CVC, ventilation) (not greater than the median/greater than the median)
Length of stay (not greater than the median/greater than the median)
In the generalized linear regression model, the negative binomial distribution was used and the log number of patient-days was treated as an offset parameter.
A stepwise forward approach was applied, and the selection criteria were the highest chi-square value and
aP value of less than 0.05 in the type III score chi-
square statistic. CI, confidence interval; CVC, central venous catheter; ICU, intensive care unit; IRR, incidence rate ratio; MRSA, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus; SR, single room.
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Page 8 of 10Further limitations are that the performed association
analysis does not allow any conclusions about causation
and that it is based on survey results that have not been
validated by observation. We did not collect data on
other important MRSA control variables such as com-
pliance with hand hygiene and used a temporal defini-
tion to differentiate between import and acquisition of
MRSA, and this might lead to a misclassification of a
number of cases. Molecular typing was not performed,
and the number of MRSA cases attributable to epidemic
MRSA strains, community-acquired MRSA, and live-
stock-associated MRSA in participating ICUs remains
unclear; however, a low percentage of community-
acquired and livestock-associated MRSA in MRSA iso-
lates from German hospitals has been reported [29].
Conclusions
Our analysis shows substantial variation of MRSA IDs
and screening and control measures among 186 ICUs.
The wide range of differences regarding ICU structure
and patient population as well as regarding MRSA IDs
and control strategies implemented in daily practice
indicates that ICUs are unlikely to benefit from a uni-
versal standardized approach to MRSA control. Differ-
ent combinations of screening and isolation measures
can be implemented without being associated with
higher IDs of ICU-acquired MRSA cases. It might be
more useful, instead of attempting a general proof of
the effectiveness of MRSA screening, to better define
the circumstances under which MRSA screening pro-
grams are most effective.
Key messages
￿ Intensive care units (ICUs) show large variation in
their methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA) incidence densities.
￿ ICUs have implemented MRSA control measures
in several different combinations.
￿ The overall number of MRSA cases is distorted by
MRSA screening.
￿ The combination and interaction of control mea-
sures have to be taken into account.
￿ The imported MRSA incidence is associated with
ICU-acquired MRSA cases independently of the
implemented screening strategy.
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